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ABSTRACT 
Motivation – Automation can fail to deliver the target safety or productivity benefit as intended by those 
managers and designers advocating its introduction. In a safety critical domain this problem is of 
significance not only because the unexpected effects of automation might prevent its widespread usage 
but also because they might turn out to be a contributor to incident and accidents. Originality/value – 
Research on failures of automation to deliver the intended benefit has focused mainly on human 
automation interaction. This PhD research plan aims at characterizing decisions - taken under productive 
pressure - for those involved in the automation development process, to identify where and when the 
initial intention the automation is supposed to deliver can drift from the initial idea. Expected Finding – 
The objective is to develop Anti-Drift Principles to identify and compensate proactively for possible 
sources of drift in the development of new automation. Research Approach – The research is based on 
case study and is currently entering Year 2. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Domain Problem: The Failure of Automation to Deliver the Intended Benefit 
In Air Traffic Control, like in many safety critical domains, the introduction of new automated tools is motivated by the 
anticipated productivity or safety benefits in overall system performance that are expected to arise after tool 
deployment. But actual performance depends on the performance that the tool actually delivers to the operator. 
Operational evidence has shown that new automation can be used in ways that differ from the way planned by those 
designers, managers, and regulators who advocated its introduction. This happens for instance when a last safety net is 
used for productivity purpose (EUROCONTROL, 2002), or a strategic conflict detection tool is used as a conflict probe 
(Montoya & Mullan, 2008). In all of these cases the initial intended benefit the tool was supposed to deliver is 
subverted.  
The problem with losing the initial design intention is particularly significant in the case of safety critical automation. 
Not only widespread use of the tool can be hampered, but the tool itself can also turn out to be a critical contributor to 
incidents and accidents. The mid air collision over the German airspace between a passenger and a cargo aircraft (BFU, 
2004) could be regarded as a failure to coordinate safety critical information in the intended way in the presence of an 
advanced automated application. 
Also, the problem is aggravated by that it is only  after the occurrence of incidents or accidents and upon completion of 
the related investigation report, usually few years later, that regulatory bodies are able to produce the remedial safety 
recommendations. However while the intent behind the investigation is to avoid that similar accidents happen again in 
the future, the recommendations tend to focus on short term operational improvements - e.g. new training and/or change 
in working procedures of the tool, software parameterization - rather than major re-design (Kinnersley & Roelen, 2007). 
After all, automated systems for safety critical domains are immensely complex and their design and implementation 
process span across decades; thus only in rare cases major redesign is advocated (Kinnersley et Roelen 2007). 
384
Rozzi • Amaldi • Kirwan 
Identifying how automation can lose its intended benefit 
  
So a sensible question is whether it is possible to intervene early on the development lifecycle. After all, waiting for 
accidents to happen to improve a new automated tool do not appears to be an effective strategy considering its cost in 
term of human life. 
Related works 
The literature on human factors and human computer interaction has long recognized that automated tools do not 
always function ideally (Alberdi et al. 2005).  In a seminal paper on the topic, Parasuraman (Parasuraman, 1997)  
reports on anecdotal evidence and results from various empirical studies to show how automation might fail. The author 
identifies three ways in which automation can be ineffectively used by the operator:  disuse, i.e. when the automated 
tool is not used, as in the case of warning alarms; misuse, when human are rely on the automated tool (even when 
information is incorrect), rather than on their own judgment; and abuse, when functions are automated “without the due 
regard to consequences for human…performance and operator’s authority” (Parasuraman, 1997). 
Automation failure to deliver the intended benefit has been studied from a cognitive engineering perspective mainly in 
socio-technical domains like Aviation (Cummings, 2004), ATC Nuclear Power Plants (Norros, 2004) and Health Care 
(Vikkelsø, 2005). Such studies have highlighted a number of automation side effects and shown that there is a 
significant difference between commonly held assumptions on the impact of a new automation on human and system 
performance and the actual impact that the technology has on the people who have to do the actual work (Sarter, 
Woods, & Billings, 1997; Vikkelsø, 2005). Examples of such side effects are: 
a. Uneven redistribution of workload; 
b. Increased complexity of the task; 
c. Introduction of new form of errors; 
d. Introduction of new coordination dependencies; 
e. Indirect Effect on workload of other co-workers. 
Overall such unwelcome effects can result in lack of trust, misuses, or disuse; also they are difficult to predict 
(Parasuraman, 1997), as they arise from the complex interaction that the new tool and the associated procedures will 
establish with the operational context in which the tool/procedures are embedded. 
Other works have looked more specifically at the so called  “alarm problem”, i.e. the failure to respond to alarm. Woods 
(1995) notes that evidence from field studies, accident investigation, design reviews, and mathematical models shows 
that humans can have difficulties to prioritize and respond to abnormal conditions despite the availability of alarm 
systems (Woods, 1995). Factors that contribute to misuse use of alarm include nuisance alert; ambiguous or 
underspecified alarm messages etc. Research efforts have focused on finding ways to improve perceptual aspects of 
alarm, i.e. how to make the physical properties of the alarm – mainly noise, frequency, and color – more salient and 
distinguishable from the background. However this approach appears as limited in scope as humans react to the 
significance and meaning that an alarm brings on a specific situation, rather than physical characteristics of signal 
display only (Norros, 2004; Ponomarenko, 2004; Woods, 1995; Xiao et al. 2004).  
Specifically to Air Traffic Control, Bolic & Hansen (2005) have investigated automation usages from an innovation 
diffusion perspective. They investigated how a conflict detection tool is being adopted and used in US is actually used 
by air traffic controllers. The authors beyond finding difference of use across centers; across teams of the same center 
noted that unplanned uses emerged. They concluded that the process of adopting new automation is faster when 
advantage of use is clearly perceived, and slows when controllers have to change their working practices for 
accommodating the new tool. The study however brought little insight on how to anticipate unpredicted usages of 
automation. 
Other authors have underlined the later intervention of human factors and safety specialist along the design process of 
new automation, as cause of misfit between operators and automation.  Despite early and continuous involvement of 
these people from initial design to operational testing is necessary to guarantee the success of the tool (Cardosi, 1998), 
often these people have access to the design process too late in the process, when many design decisions which have a 
significant impact on tool usage have been made already, thus leaving little scope for major system improvements 
(Leveson et al., 2001).). Interestingly an analysis of several accidents occurred in the aviation and nuclear industries, 
Kinnersely and Roelen (2007) had found that 50% of accidents have their root causes in errors and misconceptions 
occurring at the design stage the development cycle. This result correlated well with an earlier accident  analysis, 
which identified 59% of incident as having they, root cause in inadequate design (HSE1995). Overall, this evidence 
suggest to dig deeper into the different roles and organizational processes which sustain the development of new 
automation so to understand where the initial intention the tool could deliver can be lost along the process. 
PROPOSED APPROACH 
The present work aims at studying the emergence of failure of automation to deliver the intended benefit as function of 
holes in the tool development lifecycle. The goal is to identify where the initial intention can be lost along the design 
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and implementation process. This will make it possible to develop future automated tools by seeking proactively for 
areas where deviation from initial intention can arise. This approach is informed by a Resilience Engineering 
perspective and will be outlined in the next section. 
RESILIENCE ENGINEERING 
Safety depends on creating foresight 
According to a Resilience Engineering perspective safety depends on how organizations, groups, and individuals are 
able to create foresight thus being able to anticipate risk before failure occurs. Conversely, failure is considered as the 
absence of that ability (Hollnagel, Woods, & Levenson, 2006). Such position is based on the observation that a 
fundamental trait of high reliability organization is the ability to invest effort to anticipate and plan for unexpected 
events and future surprises (Weick, 1987; Woods, 2004). Such organizations do not take evidence of past successes a 
reason for confidence in future successes; rather they constantly challenge their model of risk on the basis that 
knowledge held by the organization need continuous improvement in face of the continuous hazards inherent in its 
works process (Hollnagel et al., 2006). 
Achieving resilience by helping organizational decision makers to balance pressures 
One way to achieve resilience is to help organizational decision makers - such as those people engaged in the 
implementation/design of new tool - to balance both intense and persisting commercial pressure against decreased 
safety and increased risk (Hollnagel 2004). 
Following the analysis of several accidents across a variety of domains, Rassmussen (1997) has found that accident 
causes are not rooted just in human error and technical failures and their combination; rather they are also rooted in the 
drift of the global behavior of the organization under strong pressure towards productivity, in the global context of a 
competitive environment. This indicates to take into considerations decisions taken by many actors involved in a given 
work process, in their normal working conditions, but exposed to a persisting competitive pressure. Rasmussen adopts 
an envelope to delimit the space of acceptable performance of people at different organizational levels which is 
bounded by administrative, functional and safety related constraints (Figure 1). When pressure is applied along one of 
the boundaries of the model it will tend to push performance toward the opposed boundaries. For instance if work speed 
is reduced the system will suffer from reduced productivity thus getting close to the boundary of economic failure. 
Conversely if productive pressure is increased performance will tend to get close to safety boundaries.  
 
 
Figure 1. Rasmussen’s space of acceptable performance (1997). 
In conclusion, applying this line of reasoning along the automation design process implies to hypothesize that initial 
design ideas undergoes some modification since its early conception. Therefore two hypotheses are explored in this 
PhD research: 
 (a) “Organizational Drifts” from the original safety intentions, while reflecting the need to compromise 
between competing stakeholder interests (Rasmussen, 1997) might later cause the “front end” to search for 
adaptations – unplanned usages - to less than ideal conditions for the tool effectiveness. 
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(b) Unplanned, “situated” usages of the tool might affect the original safety benefit the tool was intended to 
deliver;  
If both hypotheses receive support, then new specific Resilience Engineering principles can be identified along with 
methodological implications for the design cycle of new/improved tools and innovations for the ATM system. 
METHODOLOGY 
At present the work has completed an extensive review of the literature - available in Rozzi et al. (2008) - which 
contributed to define the research approach and the data requirements reported here; thus completing PhD Phase 1. 
From this point onward the work is entering Year 2 and the following two phases of work remain to complete. 
Anti Drift Principles Development, in the context of MSAW. 
This phase consists in investigating the development process of an automated alarm called Minimum Safe Altitude 
Warning System (MSAW) - which is detailed in a later section - and will cover the whole duration of PhD Year 2. In 
this context the objective is (i) to trace the path from the initial conception phase where needs, ideas, views are 
expressed by the various stakeholders involved in the definition phase, (ii) to the phase where the alarm is implemented 
and unplanned usages emerge. This phase has been broken down in three blocks of work: 
2.1 – Analysis of MSAW design/implementation process. This block focuses on tracing the actual 
development process of MSAW, to identify point of drift from initial safety intent, and motivation behind the 
drift;  
2.2 – Analysis of MSAW usages. This block will look at controller perspective as embedded in the actual 
usages of the MSAW, i.e. how the MSAW is used and why it is used in a particular way;  
2.3 – Integration.  This block will map the results of Blocks 1 and 2  in search for classes of drifts that are 
critical during the development process as they will later impact on the adaptation of the tool in the operational 
environment. This phase is expected to result in the formulation of anti drift principles. 
Main data sources for Year 2 include interviews with stakeholders involved in MSAW definition and set up, air traffic 
controllers engaged of the tool, and accident analysis. Table 1 details (i) objective, (ii) duration, (iii) data collection 
tasks, and (iv) expected outcomes for each of the three blocks of Year 2. 
Anti-Drift Principles validation 
The objective of this phase is to validate the formulated anti-drift principles. It is anticipated that validation of the 
principles will happen by apply them to an on going implementation of MSAW or in the context of another application, 
yet to be defined, to make sure safety intent is not lost during the design/implementation phase. The application chosen 
for the validation will affect the validity of PhD results. 
MSAW SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
MSAW is an automated safety net that was developed and introduced in the 70s in US as a protection against a type of 
incident known as Controlled Flight Into Terrain accidents (CFIT).  CFIT are one of the most serious aviation killers 
since the emergence of civil aviation and occur whenever a flight suffering no engine failure or other equipment 
impairment is flew into terrain, sea or other obstacles, without the crew being aware of the impending collision (Philips, 
1999). CFIT occurs especially during landing in proximity of the airport, however they might occur also during en route 
phase of flight. Thus MSAW system can be found in tower, approach and en route control centers. 
MSAW software has to alert air traffic controllers whenever aircraft descent (or are predicted to descent) below a 
minimum predetermined safe altitude. The system receives altitude information from tracked aircraft and compares it 
against terrain database. If the aircraft altitude is below or predicted to be below MSAW system generate a visual alert 
on the controller radar display and/or a aural alert in the control room. Upon generation of MSAW alert, the controller 
has to identify the aircraft that triggered the alert and inform the aircraft crew of the hazard (Greenwell, Strunk, & 
Knight, 2004). To note that responsibility to maintain separation from terrain remains with the flight crew. Also the 
MSAW does not suggest any resolution maneuver. 
The MSAW has been chosen as a suitable application for two reasons. Firstly despite being an effective safety barrier in 
principle, the ineffectiveness of MSAW to result in the controller issuing an advisory alert to the crew has been cited as 
a contributory cause in a number of accidents since its early deployment (Rosenker, 2006). During these accidents the 
tool either generated the alert at appropriate time but was unnoticed by the controller, or failed to alert the controller at 
appropriate time, thus losing its intended benefit. Also, the analysis of these accidents  indicates that root causes for 
poor tool performance can be traced to the design of the tool and its adaptation to local operational conditions which are 
unique for each control center (NTSB, 2006). The second reason is more pragmatic: Part of this research will study 
MSAW development process in US, and this can offer some valid lessons to drawn that can inform and optimize the 
deployment of MSAW in Europe. 
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Table 1. Workplan for PhD Year 2 
Block 2.1   
Analysis of MSAW design 
process 
2.2 
Analysis of MSAW usages. 
2.3  
Integration 
(i).Objective This block will look at the 
evolution of MSAW concept. Main 
objectives are to: 
(a). Trace the development of the 
MSAW application from the initial 
need, through concept, 
requirements definition phase and 
implementation;  
 
(b). Identify along this process 
points where the concept idea has 
drifted from  initial managers’ and 
engineers’ idea; 
 
(c). Understand (i) the motivation 
behind the drift, e.g. aggressive 
schedule, competing interests, and 
(ii) their acceptance criteria, which 
ultimately depends on the 
underlying decision model, e.g. 
historical success. 
This block will study unexpected 
adaptation associated to the usage of 
MSAW in operational settings. 
More specifically it will study how 
the MSAW is used by controllers, 
why it is used in a particular way, 
and whether such (under/over)use/s 
differs from the usage/s as intended 
by MSAW designers. 
The objective of this block is to 
map the (i) drifts observed along 
the design process, their associated 
motivations and acceptance 
criterion, with the (ii) associated 
MSAW related unplanned usages 
found in the operational 
environment. 
(ii).Duration Jannuary – March 2009 April – June 2009 July – December 2009 
(iii).Data 
Collection 
Task 
(T1). Interviews with managers 
and engineers involved in MSAW 
development; 
 
(T2). Attendance of project 
meetings and Review of relevant 
documentation, which depending 
on availability might include 
minutes and presentations from 
meetings, requirements documents, 
validation documents, relevant e-
mails. 
(T3). Analysis of Incidents and 
Accidents reports related to MSAW; 
 
(T4). Field Observations and 
Interviews with 
controllers/supervisors in Centre/s 
where MSAW is in use. 
 
(T5). Analysis and integration of 
finding from previous activities 
and deliverable preparation 
(iv).Expected 
Ouctomes 
- Description of MSAW 
development process, from initial 
need to conception and 
implementation; 
 
- Taxonomy of Drifts, and 
Motivation behind the Drift, and 
Acceptance criteria.  
-Taxonomy of unplanned 
adaptations associated to MSAW.  
 
- Model of the design and 
implementation process as 
influenced by drift and adaptation; 
- Resilience engineering “Anti-
drift” principles.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the emergence of unplanned usages associated to new automation appears still as a persisting issue in 
safety critical domains. Existing literature has highlighted side effects of automation and – in the case of alarm – 
research has focused on perceptual and informative aspects of tool design. The present work, while leveraging on a 
Resilience Engineering framework, explores the problem by investigating unintended usages as function of decisions 
happening during the design/implementation process. No studies in Air Traffic Control and Aviation have been found 
based on such perspective, despite evidence across a range of industries indicates that accidents often have their roots 
cause in decisions taken along the design process.  
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